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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court was proper under UCA
§78-2-2(3)(j). The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction by assignment
from the Supreme Court pursuant to UCA §78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The defendant, Brett Allen Olsen, claims that the trial
court committed error in denying his motion for change of venue.
A change of venue should be ordered if the trial court "is
satisfied that the representations made" by the moving party
support a finding that "a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in
the" county where the action is pending. Rule 29(e), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

The trial court should be "satisfied" with a

finding that there exists "a reasonable likelihood that a fair
trial cannot be had unless the motion is granted."
767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989).

State v. James,

The defendant has the burden to show

"reasonable likelihood", but that burden does not rise to a
probability.

The ruling of the trial court is reviewed for abuse

of discretion.

State v. James, supra, at 551.

Case law extant

holds that the ultimate test as to whether a denial of a motion for
change of venue constitutes an abuse of discretion is whether a
defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury.

State v. Cayer,

814 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,
1250 (Utah 1988).

However, defendant contends that this standard

of review is erroneous because it calls for an after-the-fact
analysis which is only applicable to harmless error analysis.

1

Olsen contends that James suggests a different standard of review
which must analyze whether the trial court had evidence sufficient
to find a reasonable likelihood of an unfair trial,
Olsen objected to evidence of prior crimes pursuant to
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Nevertheless, evidence of that

nature was admitted.

The admission of evidence under Rule 404 is

a

and

question

Subsidiary

of

law

factual

should

be

determinations,

reviewed

for

if

should

any,

correctness.
be

given

deference by the appellate court only if clearly erroneous. State
v. O'Neil, 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (920439-CA, February 12, 1993).
State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah App. 1991).

Reversal is

required

there

if the

reviewing

court

concludes

that

is a

reasonable likelihood that the error in admitting the improper
evidence affected the outcome of the proceedings.

State v.

Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116
(Utah 1989) .
Defendant also contends that comment upon his prior
criminal

history

constituted

prosecutorial

misconduct.

A

prosecutor's statements are improper and constitute error if they
bring to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not
be justified in considering.

Whether the information should be

considered by the jury is a question of law and is reviewed for
correctness.

Improper statements require reversal if harmful.

State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992).

The reviewing court

analyzes the matter of harm by determining whether the error is
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substantial and prejudicial so as to create a reasonable likelihood
that absent the error there would have been a more favorable result
for the defendant.

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987).

Failure to object to improper remarks by a prosecutor
will constitute waiver unless the remarks constitute plain error.
In order to constitute plain error, the error must harmful and
obvious.
despite

The reviewing court analyzes allegations of plain error
timely

objection.

State v. Emmett, supra, at 781.

Reversal is reguired if the error affects the substantial rights of
a party and a reviewing court is convinced that a reasonable
likelihood exists that absent the error the outcome below would
have been more favorable.

State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116 (Utah

1989) .
Defendant sought to introduce evidence of child abuse
suffered by him to support his claim that he was mentally ill. His
expert witness relied upon the existence of child abuse in reaching
his opinion. The court admitted the expert opinion of the doctor,
but prohibited

defendant from introducing direct evidence of

childhood abuse. The trial court grounded its ruling in relevancy.
Defendant claims that the evidence was not only relevant, but that
it was the centerpiece of his case. The only issue in the case was
whether defendant's mental illness negated the intent element of
the crime.

The trial court deprived him of the opportunity to

develop that defense by prohibiting testimony concerning child
abuse. The standard of review with reference to this issue is that

3

of correctness.
law.

Whether evidence is admissible is a question of

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).

Reversal is

required if an erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence is
harmful.

Harm exists when there is a reasonable likelihood that

the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.

State v.

Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992).
Defendant contends that the evidence was inconclusive
concerning the issue of his state of mind, and that the prosecution
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite
mental intent to commit the crime of murder.
upon

the

fact

that

each

of

the

three

He bases that claim

experts

who

testified

concluded that he suffered from mental illness, two concluded he
had

diminished

mental

capacity,

and

one

concluded

that

the

diminished mental capacity negated the intent element required by
law for a conviction.

The standard of review of an insufficiency

of evidence argument calls for the appellate court to review the
evidence and all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in a light
most favorable to the verdict.
evidence

so viewed

is

Reversal is warranted when the

sufficiently

inconclusive or

inherently

improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt.

State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Olsen was charged with murder in violation of UCA §7 6-5-

203 (Supp. 1992), a first degree felony.

He was convicted after

jury trial held on October 29 and 30, 1992.

4

The verdict was

"guilty and mentally ill." Olsen appealed the verdict to the Utah
Supreme Court (Case No. 920554), and the case was poured-over to
this court for disposition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Brett Allen Olsen, stabbed the victim,
William Paul Jensen, with a knife (T. 109) at Salina, Utah, on
September 7, 1991 (T. 100). Jensen died the next day at the Utah
Valley Regional Medical Center, Provo, Utah where he had been taken
for emergency treatment (T. 129).

Death resulted from the stab

wound complications (T. 136).
Olsen and Jensen were friends of many years (T. 159).
Jensen was 32 years old and Olsen was 23 (T. 95).
The scene of the homicide was a vacant lot (T. 101) in
Salina where young people gather to socialize (T. 101-04).

Olsen

and Jensen were present and argued about whether Jensen was
remaining sober (T. 105).

A fight resulted (T. 106).

Jensen

prevailed after wrestling Olsen to the ground and butting him, head
to head (T. 107). Olsen admitted having had too much to drink and
left in his car (T. 107).

He returned 5 minutes later with a

knife, apparently in an angry or disturbed state of mind (T. 108),
and jumped at Jensen and stabbed him (T. 109). Jensen removed the
knife and used it to slash the tires on Olsen's car (T. 109).
Police officers were contacted (T. 109), and Jensen was taken from
the scene by ambulance (T. 110).

5

Olsen was arrested a few hours later at the home of his
parents in Salina (T. 143). He did not resist arrest and remained
quiet.

He was not interviewed by the police (T. 144, 145, and

146) .
Olsen escaped from custody on October 13, 1991 (T. 97).
He was again apprehended 4 days later (T. 119).

The escape

generated massive publicity about the case (T. 90-184).
Olsen was committed to the Utah State Hospital on October
23, 1991 for competency studies (T. 25). He was found incompetent
to stand trial (T. 256) and was confined at the hospital until
August, 1992. The examiners then reported that competency had been
restored and preliminary hearing was scheduled for August 14, 1992,
but the trial court again found Olsen incompetent and he was
returned to the State Hospital for a further psychiatric evaluation
(T. 45).

Preliminary hearing finally occurred on September 14,

1992 (T. 69).
Notice of insanity defense was given on September 22,
19 92 (T. 76) and insanity studies were completed by Dr. Robert J.
Howell (T. 192) for the defense, and Drs. Bert P. Cundick (T. 236)
and Richard R. Wootton (T. 253) for the prosecution.

All were

psychologists and each testified at trial.
Olsen was diagnosed as mentally ill at age 15 (T. 218).
He had been hospitalized and treated extensively over a period of
many years (T. 199-200).

Records of mental health treatment of

Olsen were voluminous (T. 257).
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The sole issue at trial was whether Olsen's mental
illness negated the requisite mens rea for the crime of murder.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Olsen sought a change of venue from Sevier County to any
other county in the state except Wayne and Piute.
attracted

extensive

publicity

and

community

His escape

awareness

was

heightened because of door to door contact with residents by police
officers, an open-mike forum on the local radio station, bloodhound
searches,

and

multi-police

agency

participation.

Pretrial

publicity was equal to or greater than that in State v. James, 7 67
P.2d 549 (Utah 1989), including the unique factor of community
involvement, with a clear showing that there existed a reasonable
likelihood that Olsen could not receive a fair trial absent a
change of venue. The facts offered by Olsen to support his motion
were not controverted.

The court denied the motion in the face of

substantial evidence indicating a fair trial could not be held in
Sevier County.
The defense sought to prohibit introduction into evidence
of other crimes which had been committed by Olsen.
limine was granted.

A motion in

However, the prosecution made repeated

references to defendant's criminal history during direct and crossexamination of witnesses, and again during

closing argument.

Evidence of that nature is inadmissible under Rule 404, Utah Rules
of

Evidence, and

the

flagrancy

prosecutorial misconduct.

of

the

comments

constituted

The harm to defendant was particularly
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acute because the central issue in the case was his state of mind.
Olsen contended that he did not intend to harm or kill
the victim because of diminished mental capacity resulting from
mental illness. To support the claim of mental illness, he offered
the opinion of an expert witness, and evidence of significant abuse
which he received as a child.

The existence of child abuse was

relied upon by his expert witness, and to some extent by the
state's expert witnesses.

However, the court declined to admit

evidence concerning child abuse when offered by testimony from
Olsen's mother.

The court held the evidence to be irrelevant,

contrary to the liberal standard for admissibility of evidence
regarding motive and state of mind. The exclusion of that evidence
was particularly damaging to Olsen's case because it prevented him
from developing his only defense.
The three experts who testified agreed that Olsen was
mentally ill. One expert testified that the mental illness did not
negate the intent element for murder.

A second expert found that

the mental illness did negate an intent to kill, but that it did
not negate an intent to harm the victim.

Defendant's expert

concluded that the mental illness negated any intent applicable to
murder.

Thus, the evidence regarding Olsen's state of mind was

conflicting and inconsistent, and did not meet the burden of proof
on the part of the prosecution which required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had the requisite mental capacity to
commit the offense. The issue is compounded because Olsen was not

8

allowed to fully adduce his evidence of mental illness.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE.
Olsen filed a pretrial motion for a change of venue (R.
78).

The motion was supported by a memorandum

(R. 127), and

numerous affidavits reflecting case publicity by the electronic and
print media (T. 90-184).
The motion

The affidavits were not controverted.

was denied by the trial court during

conference with counsel (R. 185).

a

telephone

Neither findings nor comment

accompanied the ruling of the court.

No evidentiary hearing was

ordered to explore the alleged prejudice.

Olsen asserted that a

fair and impartial trial could not be had in Sevier County, and
requested a change of venue to any county within the state other
than Wayne and Piute (R. 127).

Wayne and Piute counties were

excluded because local newspaper circulation in those
paralleled that of Sevier County (R. 143).

counties

Olsen grounded his

motion in both federal and state constitutions and Rule 29(e), Utah
R.Crim.P. (R. 127-28).
Olsen cited the case of State v. James, 767 P. 2d 549
(Utah

1989)

to

support

his

position,

and

argued

that

his

circumstances favorably met the four-factor test articulated in
that case.
The homicide in James occurred in Logan, Utah.
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The

victim was a 3-month-old infant.

Extensive publicity resulted.

Defendant was charged with a capital offense.
the victim.

He was the father of

He initially reported that the child was missing from

a parked car which he left in a parking lot.
focused upon an effort to find the missing child.
organized and assisted in the search.

Media

coverage

Local volunteers

The remains of the infant

were found two months later in a marsh freguented by duck hunters.
Decomposition had begun, and forensic analysis was necessary for
identification.
The opinion in James defined the standard which should
govern a trial court in a venue issue.

The absence of a well

defined standard before that time was noted, and, in citing three
California cases as well as Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86
S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d
motion

600 (1966), the court concluded that a

for change of venue should be granted

upon

finding

"a

reasonable likelihood that a fair trial cannot be had unless the
motion

is

granted"

(James

at

552).

The

term

"reasonable

likelihood" was construed as something less than a probability
(James at 552) .
The

court

in

James

then

analyzed

four

factors

to

determine the potential for prejudice from pretrial publicity,
although those factors were not viewed as exclusive.
factor

is the standing of the accused

community.

The defendant

in

James

and

and

The first

the victim

his

girlfriend

in the
lived

together in Logan for only two weeks before the child disappeared.
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The defendant had long hair and wore an earring.

There was some

indication that he had been a drug user. Thus, community standing
was almost nonexistent.

In the case at bar, both Olsen and Jensen

were longtime residents of the community (R. 128).

Both had

families who operated small businesses within Sevier County (R.
147).

Those facts place the venue issue on much stronger footing

than James.
The next factor analyzed by the court in James was the
size of the community.

The court noted that Logan then had a

population of approximately 29,000, and that Cache County had an
estimated population of 69,000, observing that the smaller the
community, the more likely the need for a change of venue when the
case presents a serious crime. James, at 553. Again, the facts in
the case at bar are stronger than those in James. The population
of Salina is approximately 2,000 people, and the population of
Sevier County is approximately 15,000 people (R. 128).
A third factor analyzed by James was the nature and
gravity of the offense.

Admittedly, the nature of the crime in

James is more repulsive and heinous than the homicide in this case.
The victim in James was a 3-month-old child who was submerged in a
river and weighted down with rocks.
capital offense.

Defendant was charged with a

In this matter the charge was murder, a non-

capital offense, and the homicide occurred after an altercation
between two adults.
The final factor analyzed in James was the nature and
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extent of pretrial publicity.

Coverage by television and radio

stations as well as two local news papers was noted.

The media

items were numbered, and the adverse content as it related to the
defendant was discussed.

James, at 554.

In reaching its conclusion the court

in James was

persuaded by the unique factor of significant community involvement
in the effort to locate the missing child.

The court stated (at

554) :
This effort touched many adults, school children, and
businesses. They responded with money, material, and
countless hours of labor. This community involvement
brought may people much closed to this alleged crime than
ordinarily occurs.
Observing that the trial judge stated that despite
significant media coverage he was of the opinion that twelve jurors
could be found without bias or prejudice against the defendant, the
court in James stated (at 555):
We believe, however, that the instant case presents a set
of circumstances not usually found in criminal cases.
Here, the impact of the alleged crime reached deeply into
the community. Not only were residents exposed to media
information on almost a daily basis, but also many adults
and children assisted in one way or another in the month
and one-half search effort. Although we do not doubt
that twelve persons could be found who could honestly
promise to set aside any prejudicial information which
they had heard and any preconceived notions which they
had formed, there are limits to what should reasonably be
asked and expected of prospective jurors who have been
exposed to the events surrounding the alleged crime.
In holding that venue should be changed, the court in
James was keenly aware that the venue issue was presented before
trial of the case and that a change of venue to another county
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would avoid the potential of a second trial if the first were found
to be infirm because of adverse publicity.

Contrasted with that

situation, the case at bar presents a look at an accomplished trial
and the focus is in the opposite direction.
The
jurisprudence.

venue

issue

is

analogous

to

fourth

amendment

The legality of a search does not turn on whether

contraband is found, but on whether probable cause exists when the
search is undertaken.

A venue issue must be analyzed "through the

eyes of the trial court" in order to preserve the integrity of the
standard announced in James.

Otherwise, the trial court is left

with only "half the marbles" in its decision making process.
Strict adherence to the standard in James would also
suggest that earlier case law has marched to a different drummer.
In State v. Bishop, 753 P. 2d 439 (1988), the Utah Supreme court
utilized an "after-the-fact" analysis.
After reviewing the record, we hold without reservation that
the publicity and attendant circumstances in this case did not
amount to "one of those exceptional cases where pretrial
publicity exacerbated by State complicity encouraged the
jurors to form such strong preconceived views of the
defendant's guilt as to be considered inherently prejudicial
against him. (Quoting State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1349
(Utah 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S.Ct. 219, 58
L.Ed.2d 194 (1978)).
The court in Bishop also placed a near impossible burden
upon a defendant who claims prejudice at the trial level:
Thus, defendant has the burden of demonstrating the
existence of actual prejudice on his appeal (p. 459).
The test utilized by the court in James is a radical
departure from that employed in Bishop and much of the case law
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which preceded those decisions.
If the standard in James is applied to the facts of the
instant matter, it is apparent that the trial court committed error
in refusing to grant Olsen's motion for change of venue.

The

standing of Olsen and Jensen in the community was of much greater
significance

than

the

situation

in

James.

The

size

of

the

community (Salina with a population of 2,000, and Sevier County
with a population of 15,000) also weighs in favor of Olsen.
Although the murder charge in this case is less serious
than the capital offense in James, the pretrial publicity is in
many respects a more compelling factor. Olsen escaped from custody
shortly after his arrest for the homicide.
ensued.

Media

coverage

exploded.

An extensive manhunt

Kent L. Colby, owner

and

operator of KKWZ FM and KSVC AM, a radio station broadcasting from
Richfield, detailed

coverage of both the homicide and

Olsen's

escape, by affidavits filed in support of the motion for change of
venue (R. 85 and 164). The radio station broadcasts continuously
24 hours each day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, on both its AM
and FM wave lengths (R. 164-65).
least sixteen broadcasts

The Colby affidavits identify at

(R. 165-66).

The station reaches all

areas within Sevier County and to some extent areas in surrounding
regions (R. 164) .
The contents of the Richfield radio station broadcasts,
focusing primarily
present highly

upon the escape

inflammatory media
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and the capture of Olsen,

coverage.

The broadcast of

October 14, 1991 (R. 168) stated the following:
The sheriff's office advises all county residents to keep
their homes and cars locked and not to leave keys in
cars...Sheriff's posse has been called out.
The broadcast of October 15, 1991 (R. 173) stated that
tracking dogs were called to the area to assist in the search for
Olsen and that a local business had been burglarized, intimating
that Olsen was the burglar.

That broadcast also reported the

following:
Earlier, patrol cars cruised Richfield neighborhoods,
using loudspeakers to warn residents to lock their doors.
The radio broadcast of October 14, 1991 (R. 174) stated:
More than 40 lawmen have been going door-to-door in
Richfield neighborhoods alerting residents and looking
for clues to the whereabouts of Olsen...Meacham (Sevier
County Sheriff) says he should be considered dangerous.
On October 16, 1991 (R. 176), the Richfield radio station
aired information concerning road blocks and the use of search
dogs.

The broadcast stated:
A (sic) exhaustive manhunt under the direction of the
Sevier County Sheriff's office started off with road
block's (sic) on almost all county roads and warnings to
citizens... Search dogs and a bloodhound were brought in
and all tracks ended on the highway.
The community was alarmed because of the escape by Olsen,

and apparently fingers were pointed at the Sheriff's department.
The broadcast of October 16, 1991 (R. 177) stated:
We have asked Sheriff, (sic) John Meacham to be on open
mike to bring us up to date and confirm or deny
negligence on the departments (sic) part for allowing an
alleged killer out on the streets. Meacham has declined
our invitation.
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Apparently

Sheriff

Meacham

had

a

change

of

concerning his participation in a live radio broadcast.

heart

Later in

the day on October 16, 1991 (R. 179), the radio station broadcast
the following:
Sheriff John Meacham was on KSVC's open mike Wednesday
and responded to a barrage of calls from listeners asking
everything from the forming of vigilante groups to the
amount of fire power police are packing. Meacham also
received many calls praising his department and the work
they are doing. Carolyn Jensen, the mother of slain, 32
year old Paul Jensen, the victim of the murder that Brett
Olsen is being charged with, called to praise the police
and their efforts. Mrs. Jensen said she did not feel she
was in any more danger than anyone else, but she does
feel apprehensive.
She also stated that she felt
everything that can be done is being done and that she
hopes no one else is hurt in the process. Meacham said
their (sic) have been reports of Olsen being seen in
other parts of the state and that all calls are being
checked out.
KSL television, broadcasting from Salt Lake City, with
coverage throughout Sevier County, aired thirty two broadcasts
during September and October, 1991 (R. 90-91).

Those broadcasts

were both with and without video coverage.
KUTV

City)

issued

fifteen broadcasts during the same two months (R. 92-123).

Those

broadcasts

television

focused

on

the

(channel

escape

2,

from

Salt

Lake

custody

by

Olsen,

and

detailed the door-to-door search in Richfield (R. 97, 101).

The

television reports by KUTV also made repeated references to Olsen
being dangerous (R. 98, 100, 102, 105, 108, 110, 113, 115, and
118).

KUTV also reported that Olsen escaped by overpowering a

guard

(R. 99), an assertion which was also repeatedly aired by

other media.
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The KUTV television reports echoed local media broadcasts
by indicating the large number of officers involved in the search
(R. 106), and repeated the warnings to local citizens to stay off
the streets and lock their homes (R. 109-111). KUTV added credence
to the allegation that Olsen committed the store burglary while at
large (R. 112), and detailed the use of bloodhounds and prison dogs
to aid in the search (R. 114). The last broadcast by KUTV (R. 122)
stated:
...All this week, residents of Richfield and Salina and
points in between have been on the lookout.
KTVX television (channel 4, Salt Lake City) aired eleven
broadcasts concerning the Olsen case during October and November,
1991.

The Deseret News with a weekly circulation in Sevier County

of 911 issues, and a Sunday circulation of 1,596 issues, printed 19
articles concerning the Olsen case beginning in September, 1991 (R.
137 and 140).
The Salt Lake Tribune printed 6 articles in October and
November, 1991 (R. 141).
The most pervasive publicity relating to the Olsen case
emanated

from The Richfield Reaper, a weekly newspaper with

circulation throughout Sevier, Wayne, and Piute counties (R. 14345).

The Richfield Reaper has a weekly circulation within Sevier

County alone of 4,796 copies.

The publications dealing with the

Olsen case were submitted as attachments to the affidavit of Mark
G. Fullenbach, The Richfield Reaper publisher (R. 143, 147-63).
The contents of those articles included the following:
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Olsen is the murder suspect (R. 147)
Olsen is held without bail (R. 148)
Olsen caused the death of a friend (R. 147)
Olsen committed the homicide by stabbing with a knife (R.
147)
The escape resulted in three road blocks with all
vehicles being checked (R. 151)
The escape produced house-to-house warning of Richfield
citizens by police officers (R. 151)
A store burglary was attributed to Olsen (R. 152)
Search dogs were used from the Central Utah Correctional
Center in Gunnison (R. 152)
The Sheriff's mounted posse was employed (R. 152)
Two county search and rescue units were used (R. 152)
The Utah Highway Patrol participated (R. 152)
Police officers from the Richfield City Police Department
and the Salina Police Department assisted (R. 152)
A S.W.A.T. team aided the search (R. 152)
Three
canine
units
reported
from
Central
Utah
Correctional Facility in Gunnison (R. 152)
The Richfield Reaper article of October 23, 1991 (R. 153)
reported that over 100 lawmen participated in the search for Olsen,
The issue of December 4, 1991 (R. 156) detailed prior criminal
activity on the part of Olsen.

That publication stated:

Olsen has a long history of criminal misconduct,
including twenty six appearances in juvenile court. Past
offenses have ranged from improper vehicle registration
and misdemeanor thefts to aggravated assault and
burglary.
Olsen has also had a history of drug and
alcohol problems.
In November of 1987 Olsen beat a man with brass knuckles
during a fight, resulting in his subsequent prison
incarceration for aggravated assault.
The Richfield Reaper edition of August 5, 1992 (R. 159),
in commenting upon the escape and re-capture of Olsen, stated:
A full-scale manhunt erupted a little more than a month
later when Olsen overpowered a Sevier County jailer and
escaped. He was at large from October 13 until being
recaptured on October 17 at the home of a former
girlfriend.
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In sum, the Olsen case produced publicity regarding an
extensive manhunt, numerous roadblocks, door-to-door warnings to
citizens by police officers, drive-by warnings to citizens with
loudspeakers, and police units and bloodhounds from surrounding
areas, all combining to produce a public debate by the local radio
station which focused upon allegations that the Sevier County
Sheriff's Department was negligent in permitting Olsen to escape.
The prejudicial nature of that radio broadcast was compounded by
airing comments from the victim's mother. An entire community was
alarmed.

It is hardly imaginable that any adult person in Sevier

County was unaware of the Olsen saga.

The publicity factor in

James pales in comparison.
The voir dire process revealed evidence of the pretrial
publicity.

After prospective jurors were qualified, 16 were

selected for the preliminary panel (T. 19). Questioning by the
court followed

(T. 22).

One panel member was excused after

indicating possible prejudice (T. 51) and a replacement was seated
(T. 52). When asked about knowledge of the case, 7 of the 16 panel
members responded in the affirmative (T. 54). One of the 7 was
excused after admitting she had formed an opinion which would
impair her judgment (T. 56).
reason (T. 58).

Another was excused for the same

Replacements were called and the court then

repeated his questions to the panel as to whether opinions, formed
or expressed, could be set aside and a decision rendered solely on
the evidence (T. 60). The question produced no response and the
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voir dire continued on another subject (T. 60),

Hence, 5 panel

members remained who had acknowledged pre-conceived opinions about
the case.
record

The nature of those opinions was never explored.

The

does not reveal whether any of the panel members

with

opinions

eventually

served

as

trial

jurors.

However,

the

likelihood that pretrial publicity impacted the jurors is near
certain.
In sum, a strong showing was made by Olsen that there was
a "reasonable likelihood" that he could not receive a fair trial
absent a change of venue.

"Subsequent court proceedings

in a

community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but
a hollow formality."

Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 724, 83

S.Ct. 1417, 1418, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963).
POINT II
OTHER CRIMINAL CONDUCT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT WAS IMPROPERLY
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.
Catherine Olsen, defendant's mother, was called as a
witness by the defense (T. 151). The state's cross-examination of
Mrs. Olsen was initiated by a question which asked about Olsen's
prior involvement with the juvenile court (T. 164-65).
then objected during a bench conference (T. 165).

The defense
However, the

trial court did not enjoin that line of questioning, and the state
resumed

cross-examination

by

again

questioning

about

Olsen's

involvement in the criminal justice system, either in the adult or
the juvenile courts (T. 165).
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Later in the trial the defense again sought to exclude
evidence of prior criminal conduct on the part of Olsen, A motion
in limine was made to prohibit the state from introducing evidence
of other crimes and wrongdoing (T. 188) •

The defense wanted to

present evidence of the escape from custody by Olsen without
opening the door for the state to introduce evidence of other
crimes (T. 189-90).

Initially, the trial court indicated that it

would not grant the motion (T. 188), but then ruled that the state
would not be able to introduce evidence of prior convictions of
felonies if the defense limited its presentation to that of the
escape by Olsen (T. 190).

In its ruling the court indicated

introduction of prior convictions by defense experts would open the
door to comment by the prosecution (T. 190).
Olsen's escape was not mentioned by the defense during
the

trial

and

prior

criminal

conduct

was

not

disclosed

defendant's expert witness on direct examination.

by

However, the

prosecution clearly conveyed to the jury the fact that Olsen had
been previously involved with both the juvenile justice system and
the adult criminal system.

Dr. Robert J. Howell was called by the

defense to address the insanity issue (T. 192).
examination

of

Dr.

Howell,

the

state

appearances

by Olsen in the criminal

During cross-

inquired

justice

concerning

system, making

specific references to the juvenile court (T. 230). The prosecution
continued to explore that topic by making reference to one criminal
forum or another (T. 231). The following sequence of questions and
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answers occurred between the prosecutor and Dr. Howell (T. 230):
PROSECUTOR: And isn't it also true that every time that
there has been a psychological testing done of this
defendant, it has been done in conjunction with his
appearances in the criminal justice system?
DR. HOWELL:

That is not true.

PROSECUTOR:

When, otherwise, has it been done?

DR. HOWELL: You said psychological.
to LDS Hospital, that wasn't true.
Mountain View, that wasn't true.

Well when he went
When he went to

PROSECUTOR:
Isn't it true that he was under
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court at that time?

the

DR. HOWELL:
He was under the
Juvenile Court. That's true.

the

jurisdiction

of

PROSECUTOR: And isn't that where we deal with juvenile
criminals? Isn't that how he gets there?
DR. HOWELL:
Ah, well, I'm a little hesitant.
My
impression is that he went to LDS Hospital at the behest
of his parents, rather than Juvenile Court. I might be
wrong on that, but I don't think so. I think it was his
parents that put him there. Now it's true that he was
under the jurisdiction, but that's why I hesitated on it.
I think that was the parents that made that decision.
The prosecution again mentioned prior criminal conduct by
Olsen moments later during cross-examination of Dr. Howell with the
following (T. 231):
PROSECUTOR: Well, and so that brings us back to the fact
that this young man is depressed and he's been depressed
since he was 15-years-old?
DR. HOWELL:

That's correct.

PROSECUTOR:
And that's what everything shows.
Even
though it may have been in conjunction with his
appearances in one criminal forum or another, he's been
depressed?
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DR. HOWELL:
I would rather say he's had a major
depression, rather than say he's been depressed. They're
not the same thing.
Dr. Robert R. Wootton, a psychologist, was called by the
state as a rebuttal witness concerning the issue of insanity.
During that examination the state elicited from Dr. Wootton a
comment regarding a history of other criminal behavior on the part
of Olsen (T. 261).
Rules 404 and 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, preclude the
use of prior conduct to assert that a defendant has a criminal
predisposition.

State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986).

A

prior conviction is generally admissible only when the conviction
specifically

reflects

upon

a

defendant's

circumstances where the defendant testifies.

veracity

under

State v. Bruce, 779

P.2d 646 (Utah 1989); State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9 (Utah 1989).
Rule

609(d) specifically excludes evidence of prior

juvenile

adjudications.
The effort by the state to present information to the
jury of prior juvenile and adult criminal conduct on the part of
Olsen was clearly in contravention of the ruling of the trial court
in response to the motion in limine. The state did not attempt to
justify the introduction of evidence of other crimes under Rule
404(b) which allows introduction of evidence of that nature to show
"proof

of

knowledge,

motive,
identity,

opportunity,
or

absence

intent,
of

preparation,

mistake

or

plan,

accident."

Furthermore, evidence of other criminal conduct on the part of
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Olsen was not necessary to develop the expert opinions of the
doctors
theory.

who testified, even assuming

admissibility

under

that

The prosecution simply injected leading and editorial

comment so as to disclose improper and harmful information to the
jury.
Evidence of other crimes is not admissible where the
purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a person of evil character.
State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978).
evidence is presumed prejudicial.
(Utah 1985).

Admission of such

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 728

The prejudice to Olsen by allowing the jury to hear

repeated references to prior criminal conduct is compounded when
considered in light of the pervasive pretrial publicity which the
case attracted and the fact that the case presented the single
issue of Olsen's state of mind.
The prosecution cannot show that the defendant has been
arrested, indicted, convicted, or imprisoned for another
crime.
The rule prohibiting evidence of another crime is equally
applicable whether the evidence is elicited from a
witness for the prosecution or from the defendant
himself, and the rule applies without regard to whether
such other crime was a completed crime or a criminal
attempt. It is likewise immaterial whether evidence of
other crimes is presented by direct statements or by
implication. Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 14th Ed. Vol.
1, §178, pp. 750 & 751.
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POINT III
COMMENT UPON DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CRIMINAL CONDUCT WAS PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT AND PLAIN ERROR.
Olsen did not introduce evidence of his escape.

The

opinions of his expert witness were developed without comment upon
prior criminal activity.

The court had granted the defense motion

in limine. Nevertheless, the prosecutor repeatedly embellished his
questions with comments about prior criminal activity.

He did so

during cross-examination of defendant's expert, and allowed his own
expert to do so on direct.

The defense did not object except for

the earlier bench conference and the motion in limine.
The test to determine whether a prosecutor's statements
are improper is whether the remarks call "to the jurors' attention
matters

which

they

reaching a verdict."
1982).

would

not be

justified

in

considering

in

State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah

Improper comments by the prosecution will require reversal

if they are determined to be harmful. State v. Emmett, 839 P. 2d 781
(Utah 1992); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987); State v.
Peterson, 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 1986).

The concept of being "harmful"

turns on whether the jurors are probably influenced by the remarks.
State

v.

Tarafa,

supra.

The harmful

prong of the

test

was

discussed in State v. Tillman, supra, at 555, in the following
language:
A prosecutor's actions and remarks constitute misconduct
that merits reversal if the actions or remarks call to
the attention of the jurors matters they would not be
justified in considering in determining their verdict,
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and under the circumstances of the particular case, the
error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is
a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would
have been a more favorable result for the defendant.
It is obvious in the case at bar that the jurors were not
entitled to consider any prior criminal history on the part of
Olsen,

Information of that nature had no probative value to the

issues of the case.

Furthermore, the defense had attempted to

prevent comment about prior criminal activity by its motion in
limine.

The motion was granted by the trial

court, but

the

prosecution ignored the ruling and made repeated and unnecessary
statements

about

both

criminal history.

juvenile

court

adjudications

and

adult

The remarks by the prosecutor were repetitious,

flagrant, and unnecessary.

The case presented a single issue of

whether Olsen suffered a mental illness which negated the mens rea
of the offense.

Repeated comments about prior criminal conduct

would tend to suggest to the jury that the claim of mental illness
was

merely

numerous

his

prior

excuse
crimes.

for the moment

since

Furthermore, the

he had

evidence

existence of the appropriate mens rea was close.
experts testified.

committed
as

to

the

Three medical

Each acknowledged that Olsen suffered from

mental illness (Dr. Howell, at T. 214, 215, 219, and 221-24; Dr.
Cundick, at T. 242, 245, and 249; Dr. Wootton, at T. 264-66).

The

defense expert concluded that the mental illness negated the mens
rea (T. 221-24).

Dr. Cundick, called by the prosecution, concluded

that Olsen intended to cause injury to the victim, but that he did
not intend to kill him (T. 242, 249-50).
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The verdict of "guilty of

murder and mentally ill" also suggests that it was a close call for
the jurors.
In close cases, the substantive use of a prior conviction
can often tilt the balance in favor of conviction...State
v. Emmett, supra, at 786.
If the bench conference called by the defense, and the
later motion in limine, are insufficient to preserve the issue of
prosecutorial misconduct for review on appeal, then the plain error
doctrine should do so.
and obvious."

"Plain error is error that is both harmful

State v. Emmett, supra, at 785.

cause speaks for itself.

The record in this

The harm of the improper comments is

obvious, as is the flagrancy of the remarks since they come on the
heels of a ruling by the trial court which prohibited such evidence
unless first introduced by the defense.
minds of both counsel and the court.

The topic was fresh on the

This is a classic example of

plain error.
[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he
is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of
the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one. Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935).
The comments of the prosecutor revealed to the jury that
Olsen had been involved in the criminal justice system both as a

27

juvenile and as an adult (T. 165), that he had made appearances in
the criminal justice system (T. 2 30), that he was under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court (T. 230), that he was a juvenile
criminal (T. 230), and that he had appeared in one criminal form or
another (T. 231). The prosecutor also elicited from one of the
state's expert witness that Olsen had a history of other criminal
behavior

(T. 2 61).

Those remarks do not reach the point of

identifying a specific criminal conviction, but the impropriety is
egually assailable.
Where evidence of another crime is improper, it is
likewise improper for the prosecution to insinuate or
intimate in any way that such other crime has been
committed, whether during the examination of witnesses or
the address to the jury. Wharton's Criminal Evidence,
14th Ed. Vol. 1, §178, p. 751.
Reference to a mug shot of a defendant is improper.
State v. Jacobs, 382 P.2d

683

(Ariz 1963).

Reference to a

defendant as a parole or probation violator is not permissible.
State v. Call, (1965) 8 Ohio App 2d 277, 37 Ohio Ops 2d 274, 220
NE2d

130.

Admission of front and profile photographs of a

defendant with tape concealing words and figures at the bottom is
prejudicial error. Barnes v. United States, (1966) 124 App DC 318,
365 F.2d 509.
In State v. Tarafa, supra, defendant testified in his own
behalf and admitted a prior burglary conviction.

During closing

argument, the prosecutor argued that the prior burglary conviction
tended to prove guilt for the charges then being tried.

The court

found those comments to be highly prejudicial, observing that the
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jurors may well have been influenced by the remarks.

The court

stated (page 1373):
The substantive use of defendant's prior bad acts and
felonies added greatly to the likelihood that the jury
inferred guilty knowledge from the character of
defendant. Such use was highly prejudicial and under the
circumstances of this case cannot be said to have been
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The comments found to be improper in Tarafa were less
egregious than those in the instant matter.

The jurors in this

case

publicity.

were

exposed

to

extensive

pretrial

Many

acknowledged having knowledge of the facts of the case during voir
dire.

The comments by the prosecutor added significant damage to

an already fragile situation.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN EXCLUDING
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR ABUSE SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT
The defense sought to introduce evidence by testimony of
Olsen's mother of mental and physical abuse suffered by Olsen at
the hands of his father (T. 153-55).

The court interposed its own

objection to that evidence on grounds of relevance (T. 156).

As

questioning resumed, the court solicited an objection from the
prosecutor
157).

(T. 156).

The objection was made and sustained (T.

While a few instances of abuse were admitted, most of the

incidents which the defense sought to adduce were excluded.

The

defense thereafter proffered what the testimony would have been (T.
175-80).
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The excluded evidence was probative of Olsen's ability to
form the specific intent to commit the homicide.

The defense

argued that the childhood abuse related directly to the diagnosis
of mental illness (T. 157) and advised the court that its expert
witness had relied upon the existence of the abuse in reaching his
opinion

(T. 173).

Defense counsel

reasoned

with the

court

regarding the relevancy of the abuse evidence (T. 174):
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If a doctor says that the father abused
the boy and that that abuse was a contributing factor to
mental illness, I think the jury is entitled to know. First
they're entitled to weigh the opinion of the doctor and
whether it has a justifiable basis. But I think they're also
entitled to know that that incident is true because that lends
weight and credibility to the expert opinion.
The court took the unusual position that the doctors
could testify about the childhood abuse to the extent it supported
their expert opinions, but found it not relevant when coming from
a witness with direct knowledge (T. 173-74).
Dr. Howell considered and relied upon the earlier abuse
in forming his opinions (T. 198, 207, 208, 226 and 227).

A

dialogue between Dr. Howell and the prosecutor on cross-examination
demonstrates the reliance and the substantial nature of the abuse.
It also reveals an attack by the prosecution upon the credibility
of the evidence concerning abuse, the very thing the defense sought
to avoid by its introduction (T. 229-30).
PROSECUTOR: Isn't it true that you base a substantial part of
your analysis of Mr. Olsen's situation on a reported 200
different times that he was abused by his father?
DR. HOWELL:

I paid attention to that.
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PROSECUTOR: And isn't it true that in attempting to document
that, the only thing you have is the word of him and his
mother?
DR. HOWELL: That's correct. Well—and it shows up in other
reports. But again, that's where it comes from.
PROSECUTOR:

It comes from them?

DR. HOWELL:

Yes.

I think that's fair.

During closing argument the prosecutor again asserted
that Olsen and his mother had fabricated claims of child abuse by
the father, stating that "none of them are on any record."
299).

(T.

The state's contention was that Olsen's mental illness, and

hence, lack of intent to commit the homicide, could not flow from
child

abuse because no

such abuse occurred.

This argument

acknowledges the relevancy of that evidence.
Dr.

Cundick, one of the

state's

expert witnesses,

testified that he considered earlier abuse to Olsen in his study
(T. 250-52).

He concluded that Olsen had suffered psychological

trauma (T. 251), and that organic brain damage could not be ruled
out (T. 252).
Dr. Wootton, also called as an expert by the state (T.
254), testified that he was very concerned about brain damage (T.
258), but concluded that testing by other professionals indicated
no such damage (T. 259), a view not shared by Drs. Howell and
Cundick.
In State v. Miller, 677 P.2d 1129, 1131 (Utah 1984), the
Utah Supreme Court stated, "[w]hen a specific intent or purpose is
an

element

of

the

crime

charged,
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'basic

rules

of

evidence

pertaining to materiality and relevance require that a defendant
have the right to adduce evidence which would tend to disprove the
existence of a specific intent.'"
P.2d

643, 645 (Utah 1982).

Citing State v. Sessions, 645

The Court then held that the trial

court in Miller erroneously excluded evidence which the defendant
sought to present which would have substantiated his contention
that he could not form the specific intent necessary to commit the
conspiracy alleged in that case.

The evidence excluded would have

revealed a history of psychiatric care since childhood.
In State v. Smith, 728 P.2d 1014 (Utah 1986), the supreme
court reiterated the principles of Miller and Sessions.

In Smith

the defendant advanced the dubious argument that he would not have
knowingly pawned stolen rifles because he was afraid of returning
to prison.

To support that assertion he offered testimony that

prison would aggravate his emphysema and tuberculosis, and that he
believed his parole could be revoked on mere suspicion of criminal
conduct.

The

irrelevant.

evidence

was

excluded

by

the

trial

court

as

Finding error, the supreme court quoted Rule 1(2),

Utah Rules of Evidence, that

"evidence having any tendency in

reason to prove or disprove the existence of any material fact" is
relevant, and added that "[t]he tendency need not be particularly
strong."

Smith, at 1015.

Although a judge has discretion in ruling on relevancy,
that discretion should be exercised with considerable
liberality when the issue is motive because a wide
latitude of evidence is relevant and hence admissible to
prove motive. Smith, at 1016.
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In this case, the trial court's exclusion of Mrs. Olsen's
testimony was improper.

The evidence concerned the sole issue in

the case, whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent to
commit the homicide.

The testimony which the defense sought to

elicit from Mrs. Olsen would have substantiated the defense claim
that Olsen suffered so much physical abuse during the course of his
childhood that he may have either been brain damaged or his
judgment may have been so significantly impaired that he could not
think rationally on the evening of the homicide. Additionally, the
evidence would have demonstrated that when he was wrestled to the
ground

and

struck

on the head by the victim, Olsen had a

substantial basis for mentally transferring his hatred for his
father to the victim and that his subsequent actions were really
directed at his father. An eye witness described the fight between
Olsen and the victim (T. 106-7).

As a teenager, Olsen had a

similar encounter with his father (T. 160-1).

After the homicide

Olsen stated to his mother that the altercation with the victim
brought to mind the earlier beating by the father (T. 164).
Defendant's expert concluded "[tjhere's a symbolic significance to
being hit on the head because when that happens, he [Olsen] sees
himself as once again being hit by his father..."
evidence was not of marginal weight as in Smith.
ingredient of Olsen's case.
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The excluded

It was the chief

POINT V
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY
Olsen recognizes the reguirement to marshall the evidence
which supports the guilty verdict in a sufficiency of the evidence
argument.

State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 1991).

In

this case, the evidence was uncontroverted that Olsen committed the
homicide by stabbing the victim with a knife.

Accordingly, his

argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict
focuses upon the mens rea element.

The state contended that Olsen

"intentionally or knowingly" caused the death of the victim, or in
the alternative, that he intended "to cause serious bodily injury"
to the victim (T. 1, 261).

Those intent elements are consistent

with UCA §7 6-5-203, which proscribes the crime of murder.

The

prosecutor acknowledged that the case presented the singular issue
of Olsen's state of mind.
"[t]he only

real

In closing argument, he stated that

issue that's been

raised

is the

defendant's

capacity to know and appreciate what he was doing..." (T. 279-80).
The conduct of Olsen was available to infer state of
mind.

He had been drinking.

belligerent.
and

a

fight.

One witness described his mood as

He encountered the victim and provoked an argument
He

was

violently

subdued

by

the

victim,

and

immediately went to his home to obtain a knife. He returned to the
location of the victim, armed with the knife, aggressively pursuing
and stabbing him.

The state argued those facts in closing (T.

282) .
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The other significant body of evidence which supports the
verdict of the jury is the expert opinion of Dr. Wootton, and to a
lesser degree, the expert opinion of Dr. Cundick.

Dr. Wootton

acknowledged that Olsen suffered from the mental illness of major
depression (T. 260), that he was the victim of abuse himself (T.
261), and that his mental illness was a form of insanity (T. 262).
He found indications of depression on the part of Olsen as early as
age 15, and observed that he exhibited psychotic features (T. 2645).

However, his ultimate conclusion was that Olsen, despite his

mental illness or insanity, was not unaware of his actions in
causing the death of the victim (T. 261-2).
The testimony of Dr. Cundick

supported one of the

alternative intent elements, but not the other. He concluded that
Olsen intended to assault the victim, but that he did not intend to
kill him (T. 242).
Despite his ultimate opinion, there is much in the
testimony of Dr. Cundick to support Olsen's claim that he lacked
knowledge and understanding of his conduct. Dr. Cundick confirmed
that Olsen

suffered

from mental

illness, a long history of

depression, major depression, that he was alcohol dependent, that
he was a polysubstance abuser, that he had borderline intelligence,
and that he had anti-social characteristics (T. 240). He expressed
the view that Olsen had an I.Q. of 76, equivalent to a twelve year
old, and that his mental age of twelve years was constant (T. 24749).

He was not able to rule out organic brain damage (T. 252),
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and he postulated that Olsen's lack of memory in retrieving the
knife following the first encounter with the victim could have been
due from true amnesia, although he acknowledged that the claim of
lack of memory could have been a fabrication (T. 252). Dr. Cundick
also testified that he diagnosed Olsen as suffering from diminished
mental capacity (T. 249).
The unanimous view of the expert witnesses that Olsen was
mentally ill received credence from the fact that he had been
hospitalized at the Utah State Hospital for approximately one year
before

the

time

incompetent.

of

trial

because

of

findings

that

he

was

Indeed, Dr. Wootton, the state's strongest expert

witness, did one of the competency evaluations which reported a
finding of no competency (T. 255-56).
Olsen claims that he suffered from mental illness which
negated any intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury to the
victim.

To

support

that

claim,

Olsen

offered

evidence

of

significant abuse received at the hands of his father when a child,
and the confirming view of his expert witness.

The testimony of

his expert was admitted, but evidence of the child abuse was
excluded, except for some limited details.
Defendant's expert concluded that Olsen did have a
defense of diminished

capacity which warranted

manslaughter (T. 221-24).

a verdict of

He expressed the opinion that Olsen's

state of mind at the time of the homicide was one of gaining
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a classic M'Naghten defense.1

revenge upon his father (T. 221),

Because of the way that the insanity or diminished mental
capacity defense is raised, the prosecution must prove requisite
mental capacity to commit the offense beyond a reasonable doubt
after the defendant has raised the defense.
P.2d 643, 645 (Utah 1984).

State v. Romero, 684

Romero also states that an appellate

court may determine the question of a defendant's mental capacity
as of the time of the offense.

Therefore, in contrast to other

sufficiency issues, when a defendant argues that he did not have
the mental capacity to form the requisite intent, Romero indicates
that an appellate court may review the issue de novo.
Olsen had been mentally ill since the age of 15.
history of treatment for mental illness was extensive.

His

The three

expert witnesses agreed that he suffered from mental illness, but
disagreed markedly as to whether Olsen had the requisite intent to
commit the homicide.

The evidence in its totality fell far short

of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that Olsen knew and understood
the nature of his conduct when he attacked the victim.
CONCLUSION
Olsen's trial was fraught with error.
1

He was tried to a

M'Naghten's Case, 1 Car & K 130, 8 Scott NR 595, 10 Clark &
F 200, 8 Eng Rep 718.
Daniel M'Naghten killed Edward Drumond
believing him to be the Prime Minister. He suffered from insane
delusions. That defense was not available to Olsen because it was
abolished by the enactment of UCA §76-2-305 in 1983. However, that
statutory provision may be unconstitutional. Olsen did not raise
a constitutional claim, but the issue is presently before the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Herrera and State v. Sweezey, Case Nos.
920209 and 920265, respectively.
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jury which had been exposed to extensive and damaging pretrial
publicity.
history

Highly prejudicial evidence concerning prior criminal

was

admitted

by

the

court, and

interjected

by

the

prosecutor. Favorable and relevant evidence concerning prior child
abuse, essential to develop Olsen's mental illness defense, was
improperly excluded.
available

for the

Even with those handicaps, the evidence

jury concerning the mens

rea element was

conflicting and inconclusive, and far short of meeting the burden
of the prosecution to show the requisite mental state beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Reversal and remand

for a new trial are

requested.
Respectfully submitted,
LABRUM & TAYLOR
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